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REFLECTIONS ON DUAL REGULATION OF 
SECURITIES: A CASE FOR REALLOCATION OF 
REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES 
MANNING GILBERT WARREN III* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than fifteen years ago, I wrote an article analyzing the dual 
regulatory system for securities.1 In that article, I undertook to reaffirm the 
value of complementary state and federal regulation of securities. State 
securities regulation predated federal regulation by almost a quarter century,2 
and Congress enacted the federal scheme largely to fill regulatory gaps that 
the states could not fill because of jurisdictional limits on their authority.3 
Moreover, Congress, in the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)4 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),5 included savings clauses 
expressly preserving the jurisdiction of state securities commissions6 and all 
rights and remedies, at law or in equity, provided by the states.7 In my article, 
I addressed the extensive judicial, congressional, and executive recognition 
of the dual regulatory systems’ advantages.8 I then sought to refute 
arguments that duplication and non-uniformity somehow undermined those 
advantages.9 I even shamelessly borrowed rhetoric from the Reagan 
 
 
 * H. Edward Harter Chair of Commercial Law, Louis D. Brandeis School of Law, University 
of Louisville. 
 1. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities: A Case Against 
Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495 (1984). 
 2. See LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 3-10 (1958). 
 3. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 99 (1933), reprinted in  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 vol. 2, at 99 (1973) (Dept. of Commerce 
Study of the Economic and Legal Aspects of the Proposed Federal Securities Act) [hereinafter 
Securities Act Hearings]. Justice William Douglas, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, reiterated this point in his concurring opinion in Traveler’s Health Ass’n v. Virginia, 339 
U.S. 643, 653 (1950). Justice Douglas recognized that the enactment of federal securities laws was not 
intended to displace existing state laws, but to “fill the gap” resulting from the limited jurisdiction of 
individual states. Id.  
 4. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1994). 
 5. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1994). 
 6. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a). For a general 
discussion of the effects of the federal savings clauses, see Russell A. Smith, State “Blue-Sky” Laws 
and the Federal Securities Acts, 34 MICH . L. REV. 1135, 1160-62 (1936). 
 7. See Securities Act of 1933 § 16; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28(a). 
 8. See Warren, supra  note 1, at 501-27. 
 9. See id. at 527-37. 
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Administration’s SEC Transition Team recommending decentralization of 
securities regulatory power at the federal level through a corresponding 
expansion of state regulatory power.10 I concluded that neither federal nor 
state securities regulation impeded capital formation, but, to the contrary, 
together built the confidence on which our capital markets have been 
constructed.11 
My article did not prove particularly persuasive. Roughly ten years later, 
Congress, with virtually no debate and no widespread public support, passed 
a statute euphemistically named the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA).12 In that statute, Congress unilaterally 
withdrew the preexisting power of the states to require pre-sale registration 
disclosures by issuers, including the power to conduct pre-sale disclosure 
review,13 merit review,14 or any other kind of fairness review in connection 
with most public and private offerings of securities conducted within the 
various states’ respective jurisdictions. Congress simply rewrote the 1933 
 
 
 10. See id . at 525-26 (citing Final Report of SEC Transition Team , [Jan.-June] SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. (BNA) No. 587, at K-1 (Jan. 21, 1981)). 
 11. See id. at 537. 
 12. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (Supp. II 
1996)). 
 13. The Uniform Securities Act of 1956, adopted in whole or in part by 37 states, requires all 
offers and sales of securities not otherwise exempt to be registered by filing a disclosure document 
with the state securities commission or an administrative agency serving similar functions. UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT § 301, 7B U.L.A. 550 (1956). The Act provides three methods of registration: (1) 
registration by notification for debt securities issued by seasoned issuers, almost never used and now 
considered a “dead letter”; (2) registration by coordination for securities offerings simultaneously 
being registered with the SEC, the most commonly used method; and (3) registration by qualification, 
used in most jurisdictions for a limited number of small local or regional offerings federally exempt 
under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act. See JOSEPH C. LONG, BLUE SKY LAW § 107[1]. Scholars have 
criticized the states’ imposition of registration by coordination, as the only extensively used 
registration method, as duplicative of federal registration required by Section 5 of the 1933 Act. See, 
e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky Regulation, 10 J. CORP. 
L. 553, 556-57 (1985). One must distinguish, however, between filing and review. At the federal level, 
the SEC continues to follow policies that exclude a substantial number of registration statements from 
any administrative review. For a discussion of the SEC’s selective review process, see RICHARD W. 
JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 204-05 (8th ed. 1998). Moreover, 
differing review policies at the state level run the gamut from little, if any, review to intense scrutiny. 
Thus,  the dual system’s effectiveness necessarily depends on an ever-changing blend of regulatory 
intensity. 
 14. Traditionally, state securities regulators have employed a “fair, just and equitable” test in 
reviewing registration statements to determine whether the securities had sufficient merit to be offered 
to local residents. See generally AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON MERIT REGULATION OF THE STATE 
REGULATION OF SECURITIES COMMITTEE, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 
BUS. LAW. 785 (1986). For a discussion of the regulatory advantages of merit regulation, see Manning 
Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry: The Role of Merit Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. 
REV. 129 (1987); Hugh H. Makens, Who Speaks for the Investor? An Evaluation of the Assault on 
Merit Regulation, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 435 (1984). 
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Act’s savings clause to preempt most state laws requiring registration of, or 
imposing conditions on, a broadly-defined and open-ended group of 
securities and securities transactions.15 In doing so, Congress “stretched its 
preemptive power under the Commerce Clause beyond all constitutional 
limits.”16 It inflicted a severe, if not fatal, wound on the dual system of 
securities regulation that had protected investors and their marketplace since 
the end of the Great Depression. Some may argue that death comes too slow, 
that the coup de grace should be administered forthwith by an obviously 
compliant Congress, while the iron is still white-hot.17 In this essay, however, 
I suggest a less morbid alternative—one that might contribute to the 
development of a more rational reallocation of state regulatory power than 
presently exists in NSMIA’s chaotic aftermath. 
First, I do not readdress the development of the dual system of regulation, 
the reasons it flourished for most of this century, or arguments that the pre-
NSMIA duality should be reinstated. I do not address my own firmly held 
views that NSMIA constitutes an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause power inimical to our federalist system of government. 
Instead, I address the scope of state regulatory power that remains given 
NSMIA’s dictates and prerogatives. I then suggest for consideration 
significant alterations to the regulatory role traditionally performed by the 
states. My suggested alterations include state withdrawal from the 
registration process, with the consequential demise of merit review, and, in 
its place, the development of a notification procedure accompanied by state 
criminalization of violations of both federal registration and state notification 
requirements. I also suggest the adoption of corollary civil remedies to ensure 
supportive private enforcement of the new regime. I conclude that this 
reallocation of regulatory responsibility will realign the dual system of 
securities regulation to better achieve NSMIA’s elusive goal of regulatory 
uniformity. Moreover, this suggested reallocation should serve the statutory 
policy of the Uniform Securities Act—that its interpretation be coordinated 
with the federal securities laws.18 
 
 
 15. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
 16. Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection: Constitutional Restraints 
on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60 L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 169, 175 (1997). 
 17. See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional 
Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP . L. 175 (1997). 
 18. Section 415 of the Uniform Securities Act provides: “This act shall be so construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate 
the interpretation and administration of this act with the related federal regulation.” UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT,  § 415, 7B U.L.A. 678 (1956). Professors Louis Loss and Edward Cowett, the 
drafters of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, firmly believed that “our dual system of federal-state 
regulation in the securities field is too firmly fixed to make federal preemption even remotely 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. FEDERAL WITHDRAWAL OF STATE REGISTRATION AUTHORITY 
In NSMIA, Congress essentially gutted the states’ pre-sale disclosure and 
merit review authority, as well as the states’ regulatory power over the most 
significant federally-exempt offerings of securities. It did so by amending 
Section 18 of the 1933 Act, which provided that nothing in the 1933 Act, 
“shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State . . . 
over any security or any person.”19 The newly revised Section 18 bears little 
resemblance to the earlier version. In the amendment, Congress ordered the 
states to make no law dealing with the registration of or otherwise imposing 
limits or conditions on any “covered security.”20 The term “covered security” 
includes four legislatively defined categories of securities subject to virtually 
unlimited regulatory expansion by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). 
Marketplace Preemption 
The first category of covered securities includes all securities listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the National 
Market System of the NASDAQ Stock Market, and any other exchange with 
substantially similar listing standards, as determined by the SEC.21 In 
preempting the states from imposing registration requirements on listed 
securities, Congress federalized the marketplace exemption adopted by some 
forty-six states prior to NSMIA’s enactment.22  
In addition, Congress delegated preemptive power to the SEC, which may 
lead to continued expansion of designated marketplaces vastly beyond that 
envisaged by the states’ marketplace exemption. For example, the SEC has 
already expanded the marketplace preemption to include all securities listed 
on the Chicago Board Options Exchange, Tier I of the Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange, and Tier I of the Pacific Exchange.23 The Pacific Exchange 
 
 
practicable.” LOSS &  COWETT, supra  note 2, at 237-38. They added, “[t]he only hope for 
simplification lies in uniformity and federal-state coordination.” Id. at 238. Indeed, Congress, in its 
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (1980) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), amended the Securities Act of 1933 to mandate SEC cooperation 
with the states in the regulation of securities. Securities Act of 1933 § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c) 
(1994). 
 19. Securities Act of 1933 § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994). 
 20. Id. § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 21. See id . § 18(b)(1). 
 22. Exchange Exemptions, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) § 6401. See generally Manning Gilbert 
Warren III, The Status of the Marketplace Exemption from State Securities Registration, 41 BUS. 
LAW. 1511, 1513 (1986). 
 23. See SEC Rule 146(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(b)(1) (1999).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/6
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recently announced plans to join with Archipelago, one of the major 
“electronic communications networks,”24 in the creation of the first fully 
electronic national stock exchange, with Archipelago to function as the 
Pacific Exchange’s equity market.25 Moreover, the Chicago Stock Exchange 
has sought inclusion of its Tier I securities, which will to be added after the 
resolution of the SEC’s concerns regarding listing and maintenance 
procedures.26  
Given the globalization of the securities markets,27 the rapid development 
of internet markets,28 and the growing political and economic pressure to 
facilitate both, foreign and internet markets will likely be added to the list of 
designated markets. If those additional markets fail to meet the “substantially 
similar” criterion, the SEC probably will permit a corresponding dilution of 
qualitative and quantitative listing criteria of the markets presently 
designated, as it has done before.29  
Moreover, NSMIA’s marketplace preemption is the most highly favored 
category of securities carved out from the states’ regulatory sphere. Unlike its 
treatment of the other categories of covered securities, Congress has 
preempted the states from imposing any notice requirements or filing fees on 
 
 
 24. For a discussion of the development and regulation of electronic communications networks, 
often referred to as “alternative trading systems,” see Exchange Act Release No. 38,672 [1997 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,942. (May 23, 1997). See also Therese H. Maynard, 
What is an Exchange?”—Proprietary Electronic Trading Systems and the Statutory Definition of an 
Exchange, 49 WASH . & LEE L. REV. 833 (1992). 
 25. See Press Release, Archipelago and the Pacific Exchange Announce Plan to Create a New 
National Stock Exchange (Mar. 14, 2000). See also  Rachel Witmer, Archipelago, Pacific Exchange 
Join Forces, Create First Fully Automated U.S. Exchange, 32 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 11, at 
358 (Mar. 20, 2000). 
 26. See Securities Act Release No. 7494 [1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
¶ 86,001, at 80,102 (Jan. 2, 1998). The SEC stated that it would continue to review the Chicago Stock 
Exchange listing program and “may determine to include securities listed on [the Chicago Stock 
Exchange’s] Tier I in the future.” Id. at 80,103. 
 27. See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: 
The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INTL . L.J. 185 (1990). 
 28. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on 
Modern Securities Regulation, 52 BUS. LAW. 1195 (1997); Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public 
Offerings Conducted Over the Internet: Are They “Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 67 (1998). 
 29. The New York Stock Exchange for over sixty years refused to list companies with nonvoting 
common stock. See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303.00 (1984). When the New York Stock 
Exchange began to consider abandoning its “one share, one vote” listing criterion to retain listings it 
feared would move to other marketplaces, it was preempted by the SEC’s Rule 19c-4, which 
substantially diluted the criterion. Although Rule 19c-4 subsequently was vacated in Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990), it was incorporated into the New York Stock 
Exchange’s listing criteria. See generally 4 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 
1826-1854 (1990). For a discussion of the history and rationale of the one share, one vote controversy, 
see Manning Gilbert Warren III, One Share, One Vote: A Perception of Legitimacy, 14 J. CORP. L. 89 
(1988). 
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issuers or other sellers with respect to securities within this category. Thus, 
Congress has blindfolded the states and deprived them of a significant source 
of funds previously available for the protection of investors in securities 
traded in those designated marketplaces. 
Mutual Fund Preemption 
The second category of covered securities includes all securities issued by 
investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940.30 However, Congress has expressly preserved state authority to require 
offerors of these mutual fund securities to file with the states any document 
previously filed with the SEC under the 1933 Act and an annual or periodic 
report stating the value of securities to be offered or sold to persons located 
within the state.31 Congress has also preserved state authority to require a 
consent to service of process and payment of state-prescribed filing fees.32 
Contrary to its treatment of the states with respect to securities within the 
marketplace preemption, Congress has agreed to permit the states to require 
advance notice of mutual fund offerings within their respective 
jurisdictions.33 
Qualified Purchaser Preemption 
The third category of covered securities includes all securities offered or 
sold to “qualified purchasers,” the definition of which Congress left to the 
SEC.34 This can only be described as phantom preemption, because at the 
time of NSMIA’s enactment, Congress did not know which purchasers of 
securities might be “qualified,” which securities might consequently be 
“covered,” and thus to what extent the states would be preempted. Instead, 
Congress granted the SEC rulemaking authority to “define the term 
‘qualified purchaser’ differently with respect to different categories of 
securities, consistent with the public interest and the protection of 
investors.”35 Because the SEC has not defined the term and, in any event, 
retains broad authority to define and redefine the term, the qualified 
purchaser notion is a fluid variable.  
The SEC could look to its definition of “qualified institutional buyer” 
 
 
 30. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 31. See id . § 77r(C)(2)(A). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 35. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss2/6
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under Rule 144A36 or to its often criticized “accredited investor”37 definition 
under the Section 4(6)38 and Regulation D registration exemptions.39 If the 
SEC chooses the latter, “covered” securities will include those sold to anyone 
with $200,000 in annual income or a $1,000,000 net worth, regardless of his 
or her level of investment expertise.40 At least one commentator has 
suggested that the SEC define the term “qualified purchaser” so as to 
encompass virtually all purchasers of securities that, after NSMIA, remain 
subject to state registration authority.41 With this open-ended phantom 
preemption hanging over their heads, the states are poorly positioned to 
refashion their existing securities registration laws to accommodate their 
reallocated responsibilities. When the phantom some day becomes 
embodied, the states know only that Congress has preserved their authority to 
require notification, the filing of some limited documentation, a consent to 
service of process, and a filing fee. 
Exemption Preemption 
The fourth and final category of covered securities includes a hodge-
podge of securities and securities transactions already exempt from federal 
registration,42 as set forth below: transactions in reporting company securities 
by persons other than issuers, underwriters or dealers, which includes 
virtually all secondary trading in securities of reporting companies pursuant 
to Section 4(1);43 certain transactions in reporting company securities by 
dealers, exempt under Section 4(3);44 certain transactions by brokers, exempt 
 
 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1). Rule 144A defines the term “qualified institutional buyer” as 
one of the entities listed in the rule that “owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million 
in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity.” Id. 
 37. The term “accredited investor” is defined at SEC Rule 215, 17 C.F.R. § 230.215 (1999), to 
include five categories of entities and three categories of individual investors, including insiders of the 
issuer, persons with $1,000,000 net worth, and individuals with $200,000 income or joint income of 
$300,000 in the two years preceeding the sale and an expectatin of earning that amount in the year of 
the sale. Id. 
 38. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6). 
 39. Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (1999), is a series of eight rules, three of which, 
Rules 504, 505 and 506, provide substantive exemptions from federal registration. For a discussion of 
the origin and development of Regulation D, see generally Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: 
Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics of Regulatory Reform , 68 WASH . U. L.Q. 225 (1990); 
Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited 
Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355 (1984). 
 40. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.215(e)-(f) (1999). 
 41. See Campbell, supra  note 17, at 207. 
 42. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 43. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(A). 
 44. See id. 
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under Section 4(4);45 all securities and securities transactions exempt under 
Section 3(a),46 except municipal securities exempt under Section 3(a)(2) that 
are offered in the state where the issuer is located;47 securities offered by 
eleemosynary institutions, exempt under Section 3(a)(4);48 judicially and 
administratively approved exchanges of securities, exempt under Section 
3(a)(10);49 and intrastate offerings, exempt under section 3(a)(11).50 In sum, 
the Section 3(a) group of covered securities includes, among others, all 
governmental securities51 (except locally offered municipal securities), all 
bank52 and savings and loan association securities,53 insurance policies and 
annuities,54 and exchanges of securities not involving commissions;55 and all 
securities transactions exempt by SEC rule or regulation under Section 4(2)’s 
private offering exemption,56 which presently includes only securities 
transactions exempt under Rule 506 of Regulation D.57 
Congress, in preempting its own exemptions, apparently forgot that it 
enacted many of these exemptions from registration at the federal level based 
on its own recognition that the states already provided sufficient pre-sale 
regulatory protection.58 Moreover, given the absence of federal registration, 
these exempt securities and transactions have warranted “the greatest 
measure of protection” by the states in the past.59 Although state notice filing 
requirements are preserved, Congress has preempted the states from filling 
the regulatory gaps established by its own exemption scheme. Congress has 
exempted from state registration its own exemptions from federal 
registration. 
Congress, by enacting this “reform” legislation, has crafted a 
 
 
 45. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(B). 
 46. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1994). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Securities Act of 1933, § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(5) (1994). 
 54. Id. § 3(a)(8). 
 55. id. § 3(a)(9). 
 56. Id. § 18(b)(4)(D). 
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1999). 
 58. See Securities Act Hearings, supra  note 3, at 53 (statement of Hon. Huston Thompson). 
Although it was acknowledged that Congress could extend its own federal scheme to address the 
fairness of securities offerings, to do so would have been “getting over into a phase that [was already] 
covered by the State blue sky laws.” Id. 
 59. Edward M. Cowett, Federal-State Relationships in Securities Regulation, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 287, 293 n.36 (1959). See also Thomas Z. Wright, Correlation of State Blue Sky Laws and the 
Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 271 (1941). 
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kaleidoscopic preemption pattern, which has left the states with incoherent 
registration and exemptive authority. Given its broad preemptive sweep in 
defining these four categories of covered securities, Congress has 
significantly reduced the states’ power to regulate through registration. 
Generally speaking, the states, for now, retain registration authority only over 
securities not covered by the marketplace preemption, non-bank and non-
governmental securities, and securities not offered pursuant to Rule 506. In 
other words, the states can require registration of public offerings by non-
bank, non-governmental issuers whose securities are listed solely on the still 
“uncovered” marketplaces. These uncovered marketplace securities include 
those securities traded on the NASDAQ SmallCap market or quoted on the 
NASD OTC Bulletin Board system and otherwise uncovered securities 
offered in transactions under Section 3(b)’s regulatory exemptions (Rules 
504 and 505 of Regulation D60 and Regulation A61) or Section 4(2)’s 
statutory exemption.62  
Moreover, the states’ remaining registration terrain, as limited to these 
uncovered categories of securities, is territory beset by erosion. Congress’ 
designation of Rule 506 securities as covered securities has denied the states 
regulatory discretion with respect to an enormous volume of securities 
privately offered to investors and available for resale, free of restrictions, if 
held for only two years.63 Issuers who may have registered their offerings at 
the state level or relied on some other federal exemption leaving state 
authority in place have been provided an escape route from disclosure 
requirements under the states’ registration and exemptive schemes. 
Moreover, Congress’ “coverage” of Rule 506 securities, and not securities 
privately offered under Rule 505 or publicly-offered under Regulation A, 
among others, creates a regulatory incoherence that will continuously 
frustrate state regulatory policy. When one also considers the very real 
possibility of expanded marketplace preemption64 and the SEC’s yet unused 
preemptive authority over securities issued to qualified purchasers, one must 
question whether maintenance of state registration laws remains either a 
coherent or a practicable regulatory approach. 
In rewriting the savings clause of the 1933 Act, Congress saved three 
specific areas of state authority over covered securities. The first two, as 
previously discussed, confirmed the states’ authority to require notice filings 
 
 
 60. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (1999). 
 61. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (1999). 
 62. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). 
 63. See SEC Rule 144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k). 
 64. See supra  notes 21-29 and accompanying text. 
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and payment of filing fees with respect to all securities other than those 
subject to marketplace preemption. The third confirmed the states’ authority 
to investigate and prosecute violations of state securities laws. Section 18(c) 
of the 1933 Act provides that “the securities commission . . . of any State 
shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State to investigate and bring 
enforcement actions with respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a 
broker or dealer, in connection with securities or securities transactions.”65 
Moreover, Section 16 still provides that the rights and remedies provided by 
the 1933 Act “shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies 
that may exist at law or in equity”66 and that nothing in Section 16 excepting 
class actions involving covered securities “may be construed to preclude a 
State . . . from bringing an action involving a covered security on its own 
behalf.”67 Finally, Section 16(e), consistent with Section 18, provides that 
“the securities commission . . . of any State shall retain jurisdiction under the 
laws of such state to investigate and bring enforcement actions.”68 Thus, 
Congress, in preserving state enforcement authority, has demonstrated a 
degree of legislative grace. 
In summary, Congress’ enactment of NSMIA sent four important federal 
messages to the states. First, Congress’ preemption of covered securities 
dictates shrunken and ever-shrinking state registration authority. Second, 
Congress expressly has authorized the states to require notification filings to 
apprise state regulators of securities offerings made to their own local 
investors. Third, Congress expressly has permitted the states to collect filing 
fees, thus ensuring a source of funds to finance the states’ regulatory systems. 
Fourth, Congress has reconfirmed the authority of the states to act as “cops 
on the beat,” serving as complementary localized enforcement systems to 
protect investors and their marketplace.  
The states should listen to these messages and develop a consonant 
regulatory response. The states should consider repeal of their now 
incongruent registration requirements, the substitution of coordinated 
notification procedures, and the enhancement of their enforcement authority, 
including supplementation by more effective investor remedies. 
 
 
 65. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(c)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 66. Id. § 16(a). 
 67. Id. § 16(d)(2)(A). 
 68. Id. § 16(e). 
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III. A PROPOSAL FOR REALLOCATION OF REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITIES 
The SEC, as mandated by NSMIA,69 in October 1997 submitted a report 
to Congress assessing the extent to which the states achieved uniformity in 
their regulatory requirements for non-covered securities during the year 
following NSMIA’s enactment.70 The SEC reported that while the North 
American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)71 and certain 
individual state regulators made “progress toward achieving uniformity,” 
widespread disparities remained, requiring “more to be done to accomplish 
true uniformity among the states.”72 Subsequently, the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws established a drafting committee 
to prepare a post-NSMIA revision of the Uniform Securities Act under the 
leadership of its Reporter, Dean Joel Seligman.73 All uniform act projects 
strive for uniformity of state legislation, not uniformity of state and federal 
legislation. Yet, after almost forty-five years of experience under the 
Uniform Securities Act, it is clear that uniformity cannot be achieved even at 
the state level absent complete federal preemption of securities regulation. 
The dual system of securities regulation under a constitutional structure 
embodying federalism assumes a federal statute and fifty sets of disparate 
state securities statutes. Thus, regulatory harmony, as opposed to regulatory 
uniformity, would be considerably easier to achieve. 
My proposal for a more harmonious reallocation of the states’ regulatory 
responsibilities responds directly to Congress’ NSMIA messages: the states 
must minimize, if not eliminate, their registration hurdles for securities 
offerings; they are entitled to notice and documentation of securities 
offerings made within their respective jurisdictions; they are authorized to 
collect filing fees; and they must be permitted to enforce their own securities 
laws. My proposal for reallocation is a conceptual outline and, accordingly, 
does not provide detailed language for actual legislative provisions. I intend 
only to provide discussion critical to the reallocation debate and the future of 
 
 
 69. NSMIA, § 102(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (Supp. IV 1998). 
 70. SEC, REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFERINGS 
OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” (Oct. 1997) [hereinafter REPORT ON 
UNIFORMITY]. 
 71. The North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. (NASAA), is an 
organization of securities regulators from 65 jurisdictions located in the United States, Puerto Rico, 
Canada and Mexico. See NASAA Reports (CCH) ¶ 1, at 11 (1998). 
 72. REPORT ON UNIFORMITY , supra  note 70, at ii. 
 73. The December 2000 draft of the proposed revisions of the Uniform Securities Act, as well as 
earlier drafts dating back to October 1999, are available on the website of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). NCCUSL, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, 
Official site, Uniform Securities Act, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/securities/sec1200a.html. 
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our dual system of securities regulation. My proposal would reallocate 
regulatory authority in accordance with NSMIA’s federal messages, thereby 
producing a substantially higher degree of regulatory harmony in the dual 
system of securities regulation.  
Moreover, the present definition of preempted “covered securities” is 
incredibly complex, and the state’s interpretive power as to whether 
particular securities are covered is at least questionable. At best, the 
definition is a fluid one, subject to continuous regulatory expansion by the 
SEC regarding the marketplace and qualified purchaser categories of covered 
securities. In addition, Congress continues to be prodded to accomplish 
statutory expansion. Even NASAA, finally understanding NSMIA’s antistate 
registration message, has recommended that Congress should expand the 
multipart definition of covered securities to include numerous types of 
securities not presently covered under NSMIA’s current definition.74 Because 
the federal definition of covered securities is in a state of flux, the corollary 
definition of state registrable securities is as well. In this context, the states 
are not well-positioned to make prudent regulatory policy determinations, 
particularly securities registration policies. Congress’ NSMIA reallocation 
has, in effect, rendered the states’ registration requirements hopelessly 
incoherent. 
My proposal, as suggested by my previously expressed recognition of 
NSMIA’s congressional messages, recommends consideration of several 
interrelated concepts. The first and most transformative is that the states 
consider the elimination of their registration requirements for all offers and 
sales of securities, whether made in the primary markets as distributions or in 
the secondary markets as trading transactions. States would thus place 
registration solely in the federal province, without requiring disclosure or 
merit review prior to the offer or sale of securities. Consequently, issuers 
could abandon the complex search for the state registrable security once and 
for all. Moreover, uniformity of the registration process would be achieved 
without suffering further excruciating rounds of federal preemption. 
Congress’ hostility to state regulation might be ameliorated and collaboration 
with the SEC vastly improved. Elimination of state registration requirements 
would debase arguments that the states’ securities laws impose regulatory 
barriers to capital formation, internationalization, and the facilitation of 
internet securities markets. Federal and state regulatory philosophies finally 
would be aligned in the sense that the states’ abdication of registration 
 
 
 74. See NASAA, NASAA’s Comments Regarding the Recommendations Submitted for the 
Securities Markets Enhancement Act (last modified May 8, 2000) <http://www.nasaa.org/whoweare/ 
speeches/smea.htm>. 
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authority would leave little to align. Consequently, the states could more 
efficiently focus their resources on the one area of state securities regulation 
Congress continues to embrace: enforcement. To the extent that this 
regulatory transformation creates regulatory gaps, Congress could fill those 
gaps just as it did with its 1933 legislation.75 
One could argue that no serious “registration” gaps remain. The abolition 
of state registration by coordination of offerings of non-covered securities, 
still the most commonly-used state registration method, arguably would 
produce no regulatory gap, given continued federal registration of those 
offerings. The rarely-used state registration by notification method is widely 
regarded as a dead letter. The states’ third type of registration authority, state 
registration by qualification, generally has been applied to securities 
offerings exempt at the federal level under either the intrastate exemption or 
the three Section 3(b) exemptions, which include Rules 50476 and 50577 of 
Regulation D and Regulation A.78  
In recent years, state-registered intrastate offerings and exempt Rule 505 
offerings have virtually disappeared. Regulation A’s disclosure requirements 
roughly approximate requirements applicable to fully-registered offerings.79 
Thus, as a practical matter, only Rule 504 offerings could be said to fall into 
a regulatory gap. It is likely, however, that issuers will no longer rely on Rule 
504, because absent state registration, Rule 504 securities would remain 
restricted in the hands of non-affiliates for two years after purchase.80 Most, 
if not all, would-be Rule 504 issuers would be likely to shift their reliance to 
either Rule 506, thus converting the securities into “covered securities,” or 
Regulation A and its “mini-registration” disclosure requirements. 
Consequently, the impact of my proposal, given NSMIA’s current 
preemption, may not be as far-reaching as it would first appear. The only 
obvious regulatory gap remaining is the absence of merit review, which, 
many would argue, leaves no gap at all. 
The second concept I propose requires the states to substitute a 
standardized notification procedure for the registration process they would 
 
 
 75. See supra note 3 and accompanying test. 
 76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (1999). 
 77. Id. § 230.505. 
 78. Id. § 230.251-.263. 
 79. See JENNINGS ET AL., supra  note 13, at 432-34. 
 80. In Rule 504, 17 C.F.R. § 230.504, the SEC provided that resales of securities offered in 
transactions exempt under the rule would be restricted unless the securities were acquired in state-
registered offerings or state-exempt accredited investor offerings. SEC Rule 504(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.504(b)(1); SEC Rule 502(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d). Rule 144 permits such securities to be 
resold by non-affiliates of the issuer free of all restrictions after a two-year holding period. SEC Rule 
144(k), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(k). 
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abandon. Effective enforcement depends to a large extent on providing 
information to state regulators sufficient to apprise them of securities 
offerings made to investors within the states’ respective jurisdictions. 
Congress, in NSMIA, legislated this policy in its confirmation of state 
authority to require state filing of all documents filed with the SEC, as well 
as periodic reports of the value of securities offered to persons located in a 
given state. Without this information, state regulators would be constrained 
substantially in their efforts to protect local investors. Moreover, Congress 
has expressly authorized state regulators to suspend any offer of securities 
made within their respective states if issuers fail to provide required notice 
filings.81 These filings, accompanied by consents to service of process, would 
significantly enhance the enforcement objectives shared by both Congress 
and the states. Notice, after all, provides investigatory opportunities. 
Although Congress preempted state notice filing requirements as to 
nationally traded securities covered by its marketplace preemption,82 it may 
be persuaded to reconsider the issue given the states’ complete withdrawal 
from regulation through registration. Of course, in formulating their notice 
filing requirements, the states should consider whether they already have 
access to the information notice filings would provide by virtue of publicly-
available SEC databases.83 Consequently, the states may find it desirable to 
tailor their notice filing requirements to all offerings exempted from federal 
registration requirements. They also may want to except from their notice 
filing requirements offerings made pursuant to Section 4(2)’s statutory 
exemption.84 The states’ enforcement interests are unlikely to be served by 
notice filings resulting from business entity formations or private placements 
to insiders.  
The states should consider development of a web-based central 
notification depository, perhaps coordinated by NASAA, functionally similar 
to the Central Registration Depository85 for market professionals established 
 
 
 81. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(c)(3); 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1998). 
 82. Id. § 18(c)(2)(D). 
 83. For example, the SEC mandates the electronic submission of certain required filings under 
the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Trust Indenture Act, the 
Investment Company Act, and the Public Utility Act. See 17 C.F.R. § 232.101 (1999). Since 1996, the 
SEC has required all domestic public companies to post these filings through the EDGAR system, 
which then displays them on the SEC’s website. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
EDGAR Database of Corporate Information (last modified Apr. 17, 2000) <http://www.sec.gov/ 
edgarhp.htm]. 
 84. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(2); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1994). 
 85. The Central Registration Depository (CRD), developed jointly by The National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) and The North American Securities Administration Association 
(NASAA), facilitates simultaneous state and federal registration of broker-dealers and their agents. 
NASD Regulation, Inc., now maintains the qualification, employment and disclosure histories of over 
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by NASAA and the National Association of Securities Dealers. State 
regulators might make the information they compile and share directly 
available to local investors through physical or internet access, at least to the 
extent this would not otherwise result in the loss of federal exemptions. This 
central notification depository would complement the traditional role of state 
securities commissions as accessible consumer information bureaus for local 
investors.86 
The third part of my proposal suggests that the states, as authorized by 
NSMIA, impose filing fees in order to finance their enforcement programs. 
The regulatory process obviously imposes costs upon either the general 
public through tax revenues or the regulated issuer through filing fees. In my 
view, the latter would be more equitable. The ability to collect these fees 
would encourage the states to impose broader notice filing requirements, 
while at the same time potentially facilitate lower fees. The states should 
strive to balance their respective levels of fees charged with the budgets of 
their respective regulatory programs. In making these calculations, the states 
should also take into account fee revenue obtained from securities 
professionals, including broker-dealers, investment advisers, and their agents, 
whose regulation by the states is unaffected by my proposal and vital to my 
proposal’s effectiveness in providing investor protection. 
The final concept incorporated into my proposal is that the states grant 
significantly greater enforcement power to their securities regulators and 
enhanced civil remedies to their investors. Among other enhancements, the 
states’ securities laws, to promote the desired uniformity with the federal 
regime, should provide criminal, administrative, and civil remedies for 
violation of the federal registration requirements. These remedies should 
supplement state remedies provided for violation of state regulatory 
requirements (which would no longer relate to securities registration 
violations) and available common law remedies.  
This concept resembles that approved by the U.S. House of 
Representatives in the version of the 1933 Act it initially passed.87 The 
House bill contained a provision making it a federal crime to offer in 
interstate commerce securities that failed to comply with the laws of any state 
where they were to be sold.88 Although a Senate amendment ultimately 
 
 
500,000 registered agents through its electronic Web CRD system. See http://www.nasdr.com. 
 86. See Warren, supra note 1, at 530-31. 
 87. See Securities Act Hearings, supra  note 3, at 85. 
 88. Section 18(a) of the House bill proposed:  
It is made unlawful for any person to make use of the mails or any means or instruments of 
interstate commerce to sell or deliver any security to any person in any State, where such sale or 
delivery, if it had taken place wholly within such State, would be in violation of the laws thereof 
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eliminated this provision, it was intended “to insure the states since 1933 it 
was not an attempt to supplant their laws but an attempt to supplement their 
laws. . .”89  
My proposal incorporates the reverse. Because much of their own 
registration law has been federalized and the rest would be voluntarily 
abandoned pursuant to my proposal, the states should align their own policies 
and enforcement resources to supplement the federal securities laws by 
assisting the SEC in the enforcement of those laws. Accordingly, the states’ 
securities laws should penalize both failure to register violations of federal 
law as well as failure to notify violations of state law. Existing administrative 
and criminal sanctions for securities fraud and other misconduct should 
remain in place. Lastly, the states also should adopt corollary private 
remedies for rescission based on failure to federally register or to state notify 
in substitution for the failure to state register remedy currently afforded by 
the states’ securities laws.90 Again, these newly-fashioned civil remedies 
should supplement express causes of action presently provided by the states’ 
securities laws. This final aspect of my proposal would contribute 
substantially to a desirable realignment of state and federal enforcement 
policies in the dual regulatory system. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I have assessed the regulatory dilemma resulting from 
Congress’ enactment of NSMIA. Although, as a normative matter, I firmly 
disagree with Congress’ legislation, I have concluded that the states’ 
securities registration authority has been transformed by NSMIA into an 
increasingly chaotic regulatory approach. The states should voluntarily 
discontinue as a matter of policy their ever-shrinking authority to register 
whatever remains of state registrable securities. My proposal conceptualizes 
a regulatory approach that both yields to and embraces federal registration 
authority while enhancing the enforcement role of the states that Congress 
has continued to reaffirm. By advancing this proposal, I hope to encourage 
the states to harmonize their own regulatory policies with federal ones in 
order to preempt further rounds of preemption. 
 
 
relating to the sale of securities.  
Id. 
 89. Securities Act Hearings, supra  note 3, at 117. 
 90. See Uniform Securities Act, § 410(a)(1), 7B U.L.A. 643 (1956). 
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